Law and Literature: A Dilettante’s Dream? by Twining, W








n November 2013 I gave a lecture in Wolfson College, Oxford entitled: “LAW  AND 
LITERATURE: A DILETTANTE’S DREAM?”.  It was in two parts. Part A expressed 
guarded scepticism about ‘The Law and Literature Movement’ (LLit). The thesis was 
simple: in this context neither ‘Literature’ nor ‘Law’ have one referent. As academic fields, 
these disciplines are far too broad and internally fragmented to have one coherent set of 
relations; as phenomena (e.g. literature as a heritage of texts, law as institutions, processes in 
‘the real world,’ as well as laws as ideas) they are too varied and amorphous to be reduced to 
a coherent set of subject-matters that can be sensibly juxtaposed. There are specific, focused 
topics and themes that have produced illuminating insights, such as Shakespeare’s 
constitutional ideas and assumptions, but much of the secondary discussion of the ‘movement’ 
is over-generalized. 
In Part B, abandoning any effort to generalize about the movement or alleged ‘field,’ I 
descended into autobiography. I told some specific stories about how some eclectic 
engagements with ‘literature’ had influenced my own thought and work: not just as grace 
notes, or quotation-dropping, or otherwise showing off or frolicking. Part B was more 
successful than Part A. It suggested a question that each of you may ask yourself: what, if 
anything, in the heritage of literature or literary studies has significantly influenced my work in 
law? Why? 
Part B, with only minor changes, is reproduced here. In this version I have retained 
the informal style of the lecture, but I have added a few footnotes.1 It deals with three topics: 
(i) standpoint; (ii) narrative and argument in fact-finding; (iii) Italo Calvino and Jurisprudence. 
 
II. Standpoint2 
My first example of being helped as a jurist by “literature” relates to what is now old-fashioned 
literary criticism. As an undergraduate my interest in Jurisprudence - indeed in law - had been 
                                                   
1 References to works by the author cited in the text include William Twining, Globalisation and Legal 
Theory (Butterworth 2000) (hereafter GLT);  The Great Juristic Bazaar (Ashgate, 2002)(hereafter GJB); 
Rethinking Evidence (Cambridge University Press 2nd edn 2006) (hereafter RE); General Jurisprudence 
(Cambridge, 2009)(hereafter GJP); with Terence Anderson and David Schum, Analysis of Evidence 
(Cambridge University Press 2nd edn 2005) (hereafter AN); and with David Miers, How To Do Things With 
Rules (Cambridge University Press 5th edn 2010) (hereafter HTDTWR).    
2 William Twining, ‘The Bad Man Revisited’ (1975) 58 Cornell Law Rev. 275 (reprinted in GJB Ch. 3); 
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inspired by Herbert Hart, especially his inaugural lecture, delivered in 1952.3  However, over 
time I became increasingly dissatisfied by his narrow view of the agenda of Jurisprudence.4 
This linked up with an adolescent worry about belief pluralism that I have never grown out 
of: how to cope with the fact that there are many belief systems, all claiming to be right? Shortly 
after I graduated I read, and was enthralled by, R.G. Collingwood’s Autobiography -_ surely a 
great work of literature, indeed of fiction.5 The key idea for me was that all history is the history 
of thought: to understand Aristotle, or Nelson’s decisions at Trafalgar, one needs to put oneself 
in the writer’s or actor’s shoes and try to understand the their situation, concerns, concepts, 
and information in order to reconstruct what they were thinking and what it meant. Reading 
Collingwood was for me a huge step forward, but it did not quite dissolve all my puzzles.  
Soon after being excited by Collingwood, I read E. M. Forster’s Aspects of the Novel, 
written in 1927.6 As a serious-minded auto-didact, I even read some of the works he discussed. 
Two related, seemingly contradictory, ideas grabbed me. First, Forster praised Percy 
Lubbock’s The Craft of Fiction (first published in 1921) and quoted with approval his statement: 
“The whole intricate question of method, in the craft of fiction, I take to be governed by 
the question of the point of view - the question of the relation in which the narrator stands 
to the story.”7 
I devoured Lubbock and his distinctions between the impartial or partial onlooker and 
the omniscient author; and seeing everything through the eyes of one or more participants. 
This developed Collingwood’s idea of history by differentiating several different types of points 
of view and, as we shall see, it had immediate resonance in relation to studying law. 
In the latter parts of Aspects of the Novel Forster seemed to alter course. He sharply 
criticised Henry James for adhering too rigidly to a consistent standpoint - sacrificing 
humanity and life to aesthetic form. In particular, in The Ambassadors James constructed an 
aesthetically complete form - like an hourglass: 
 “[B]ut at what sacrifice! … the cost is a very short list of characters, - mainly one observer 
who tries to influence the action and the second-rate outsider - and these characters ….are 
constructed on very stingy lines…. Why so wanton with human beings?”8  
In short, James’ formalism cut out the messy reality of life. That was just how I felt 
about law and the dominant tradition -_ only a little less dominant today -_ of doctrinal 
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6 EM Forster, Aspects of the Novel (Edward Arnold 1927) 
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a masterly analysis [by Percy Lubbock] from another standpoint in The Craft of Fiction’ (Forster n.7) 141.  




formalism (whatever that means). So, I defected from Hart -_ at least he thought so -_ to 
something called “realism” and from then on standpoint and multiple perspectives became 
key concepts. 
 I soon recognized that differentiation of standpoint was already a powerful tool in 
Analytical Jurisprudence and Philosophy. 9  For example, Bentham’s distinction between 
expository and censorial jurisprudence and Rawls’ claim to dissolve a puzzlement about act- 
and rule-utilitarianism by assigning the former to the judge’s question and the latter to the 
legislator’s question in respect of punishment: the legislator asks who should be punished 
under what conditions? The judge asks: should I punish this person? In Jurisprudence Hart, 
Lasswell and McDougal, and Holmes were among those who used differentiation of 
standpoints to advance their ideas.10 
 However, it seemed to me that standpoint analysis should not stop at abstract 
distinctions between observers and participants, external and internal points of view, and 
elusive differentiations between subjective and objective -__ such distinctions often break 
down.  Take, for example, the distinction between participants, observers, and participant-
observers. Much of legal scholarship, legal theorising, and legal education is participant-
oriented. A central part of Anglo-American traditions of pedagogy involves making students 
adopt different roles: advise your client; make the case for the plaintiff; decide this case; change 
the law. We ask them to pretend to be different kinds of actors, mainly in the upper reaches of 
the system: Supreme Court Justices, legislators, Lord Chancellors or Justice Ministers.11  Less 
often do they pretend to be lowly actors such as consumers, victims, convicted criminals, or 
other users of law and legal processes. Subaltern points of view are not well-developed in our 
tradition of academic law but have been seized on by some members of the Law and Literature 
Movement.12   
Nietzsche suggested that the commonest form of stupidity consists in forgetting what 
one is trying to do.13 For my students, I have found that the commonest form of stupidity is 
forgetting who they are pretending to be. So, I make the clarification of standpoint an essential 
first step for them in a variety of intellectual exercises.14  
                                                   
9  The concept of standpoint is highly ambiguous and means different things in different contexts. Terms 
such as vantage point, situation, role, perspective, and objectives need to be differentiated ___ how important 
each of them is depends largely on context. For example, “clarification of standpoint’ is different for a law 
student preparing to write an essay on causation and a lawyer meeting her client for the first time. See GJB 
29-37 and references in n.3 above. 
10  Jeremy Bentham, A Fragment on Government (1776; ed. JH Burns and HLA Hart, Athlone Press 1977) 397-
98; John Rawls, ’Two Concepts of Rules’ (1955) 64 Philosophical Rev. 72, HLA Hart, Punishment and 
Responsibility (Oxford University Press 1968) Ch. 1 (first published in 1959), H. Lasswell and M. McDougal, 
‘Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest’ (1943) 52 Yale Law J. 203; 
O. W. Holmes Jr, ‘The Path of the Law’ (1897) 10 Harvard L. Rev. 457  __ see generally GJB Ch.3  
11 HTDTWR Preface xv-xvi 
12  For me, one of the most powerful pleas for ‘subaltern’ voices to be heard and accorded their rights is by 
an academic lawyer, Upendra Baxi, “Voices of Suffering: Fragmented Universality and the Future of 
Human Rights” (1998) Law and Contemporary Problems 125, reprinted in full in W. Twining (ed.) Human 
Rights: Southern Voices. (Cambridge University Press 2009) Ch.5..   
13 Often translated as “forgetting one’s purpose” (The Wanderer and his Shadow, 1880). 
14 Of course, there are many types of historians and many types of observer that can be further differentiated. 




There is a standard repertory of stereotypical or abstract roles in legal discourse - the 
legislator, the judge, prosecutor, defence lawyer, negotiator, adviser, and so on. There are also 
familiar images like economic man, Hart’s internal point of view (mainly of officials), Kelsen’s 
“legal point of view”,15  Dworkin’s ideal judge Hercules, Holmes’ Bad Man, the puzzled 
interpreter, a cynical tax consultant, Mutt and Jeff (soft/hard police interrogation), the upright 
judge.16 There are many kinds of legal actor and each kind can be further broken down into 
sub-species. But at some point, especially in socio-legal studies, one needs to focus on 
particularities. If one is interested in what actually happens, what actual participants are like, 
and real-life experiences, one needs to think empirically in terms of the actual characteristics 
of real people - how they in fact think, reason, argue, decide, behave.  
So, two 1920s literary critics or commentators inspired some of what for me has been a 
crucial set of tools for thinking about law. Of course, literary theory has moved on and has 
become more sophisticated -_ indeed, often too sophisticated for a mere jurist. From time to 
time I have dabbled with reader response theory, perspectivism, the intentionist fallacy, 
deconstruction, and some other fads, fashions, and frolics of academic literary studies. But 
that has been more like dilettantism on my part and I personally have not found any of them 
very helpful. 
 
A. Standpoint and narrative: The Shakespearean and the Jurist 
The subtleties of standpoint analysis are illustrated by a strange collaboration that I have had 
with a Shakespeare scholar (and social historian) René Weis of the English Department at 
University College London. For years, in teaching law students how to analyse evidence and 
construct arguments about questions of fact in complex cases, I have used the English 1920s 
cause célèbre of R v Bywaters and Thompson.17 Frederick Bywaters and Edith Thompson were 
convicted of murdering Edith’s husband Percy - Freddy for stabbing him, Edith for inciting 
and conspiring with Freddy to kill Percy. Edith was convicted largely on the basis of some 
sixty love letters to Freddy, many in a gushing, stream-of-consciousness, elliptical style.18 I 
chose the case, because as one student said: “If you can analyse Edith’s prose, you can analyse 
anything.” The case, like the Sacco Vanzetti case in America,19 became something of a literary 
event: it stimulated several plays, at least one very bad film, and a brilliant feminist novel, A 
Pin to See the Peepshow.20 Opinion is still divided about Edith’s guilt. 
After some years, I wrote an article using Bywaters and Thompson to illustrate the 
method of analysis and argument construction that I was trying to teach.21 Only after the essay 
                                                   
15  On which see Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford University Press 1979) .140-43. 
16  For examples see HTDTWR 15-23.  
17  AN. Ch. 7, RE Ch. 12.  
18  The trial record and some other letters are published in full in Filson Young (ed.) The Trial of Frederick 
Bywaters and Edith Thompson (W. Hodge, 1923) 
19 David Felix, Protest: Sacco-Vanzetti and the Intellectuals (University of Indiana Press, 1965) 
20  F. Tennyson Jesse, A Pin to See the Peepshow (Heinemann, 1934) (reissued by Virago Modern Classics, 
1979).  
21 W. Twining, “Anatomy of a cause célèbre” in RE (1990) Ch.8 and 9 (abbreviated in RE 2nd edn. Ch.12, 
Parts 1 and 2.)  




was complete did I learn that a colleague in English at UCL had just finished a whole book 
on the case, passionately arguing Edith’s innocence.22 We compared notes and decided to 
publish our pieces separately without changing them, but then to write a joint paper comparing 
our different approaches to the case. 23  For me, this was a fascinating and instructive 
experience. Here, I will only deal with this insofar as it illustrates the complexities of 
standpoint. We both reached similar conclusions about Edith’s guilt, but by strikingly different 
routes.24 
The first point is whether, in considering Edith’s guilt, we were addressing the same 
question. The answer to this is contested. I maintain that we were not concerned with the 
fairness of the trial, but adopting the standpoint of historians 80 or so years after the event we 
were asking whether Edith was criminally responsible for Percy’s death in fact on the basis of 
the law at the time.  To answer the question a historian would need to know the applicable 
law of murder, including the murky doctrine surrounding incitement and conspiracy. Weis’s 
perspective, objectives, and methods were different from mine and he produced a lot of new 
data. The fact that Weis is not a lawyer is irrelevant. Some students disagree, emphasizing our 
different methods. In my view, they are wrong. Our question was shared. 
 Our methods were indeed very different and we brought to bear different lenses. I 
focused on the trial record, mainly Edith’s letters to her lover, and subjected it to critical 
analysis, illustrating the method I was trying to teach. I concluded that the evidence for 
conspiracy was very weak, but the evidence of incitement was colourable, though not quite 
strong enough to satisfy the reasonable doubt standard, especially in relation to the question 
whether Freddy killed Percy because of Edith’s incitement - on this a reasonable jury and 
commentators could disagree. 
What did the Shakespearean do? First, he set the trial in the context of social conditions 
and attitudes of the time, the life stories of the main actors, and, most tellingly, the stormy 
course of their relationship. He dug up a great deal of new material about the trial, the 
personalities involved, and the romantic novels in which Edith immersed herself --- using all 
this to construct a theory of Edith living in a fantasy world and never intending that Percy 
should be murdered. Second, he constructed a master narrative of Edith’s life and death in the 
social context of her times. Third, he brought his skills as a textual scholar to bear on a minute 
and scrupulous examination of Edith’s letters as texts. He constructed a detailed, almost day-
by-day, account of the 18-month relationship with Freddy and then set each letter in the 
context of the ups and downs of that relationship. By doing this for each significant letter he 
was able to infer Edith’s mood, the effect of each passage, and that some words and phrases 
were thematic or part of a lovers’ code. 
You can imagine that this prosaic lawyer was made goggle-eyed by this scintillating 
performance. I learned a lot about the case and how to read love letters, but almost nothing 
                                                   
22 R. Weis, Criminal Justice: the True Story of Edith Thompson. (Hamish Hamilton 1988; Penguin, 2001). 
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and the Jurist” in W. Twining and Ian Hampsher-Monk (eds) Evidence and Inference in History and Law 
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24 The claim that the Sacco Vanzetti case was the only literary event in America between two world wars is 
sometimes attributed to H.L. Mencken. I have not yet been able to trace the original quotation. 




about Shakespeare. There was one flaw. Weis’s argument was that Edith lacked criminal 
intent. At least a dozen letters could be construed as acts of incitement - some subtle, but some 
crude: “I wish we had not got electric light - it would be easy.”25 “What exactly would be so 
easy, Mrs. Thompson?” “I used the “light bulb” three times but the third time - he found a 
piece - so I’ve given up until you come home.”26 “I’ll risk and try if you will.” It stretches the 
imagination that none of these passages involved intent to kill Percy and incite Freddy. Weis 
did not focus exactly on what the prosecution had to prove and on the several material facts, 
as we lawyers call them. A better line of defence would be that Freddy did not take Edith’s 
letters seriously and that his knifing of Percy was spontaneous rather than premeditated, so 
that he did not kill Percy because of Edith’s incitement or in pursuance of a conspiracy.  
It is tempting to say that Weis used a narrative approach and I used a logical one. But 
this is misleading. Each of us used both. Weis tested key elements in his grand narratives and 
sub-plots against evidence -_ especially the evidence of the letters. I used narrative to imagine 
possible scenarios, to construct hypotheses, and to wrap the strongest case for and against 
Edith in a coherent story that made sense of the case as a whole. By the time I came to write 
about the case, I was already convinced that both narrative and logic are necessary in 
reconstructing past events. There was however a major theoretical problem: in this kind of 
approach to reconstructing particular past events, what is the relationship between evidence, 
narrative, and argument? 
III. Narrative 
A. Uses and abuses of narrative: stories as necessary, but dangerous 
This brings us to another story. Once upon a time, in the early seventies, the French 
philosopher, Paul Ricoeur, visited the University of Warwick. His legacy was a series of 
seminars on “Narrative as an instrument of culture”, which was interpreted as academic 
culture. The organizers divided academic disciplines into three rough categories: ‘Not 
Obvious’, such as economics, the philosophy of science, physics, and geography; ‘Obvious’, 
such as literature, history, and theology; and ‘In-between’, including law, anthropology, and 
sociology.27   
They began with ‘Not Obvious’ and invited scholars from disciplines in that category 
to discuss the role of narrative in their own discipline or sub-discipline. Whether or not they 
had thought about it before, all of the contributors found story-telling playing various roles in 
their field. 28  For example, a philosopher of science, Rom Harré, reported how scientific 
journals rarely give a realistic account of the story of an experiment (‘Milly sneezed and 
                                                   
25 25 Trial Exh 17, AN p.189.. 
26 Trial Exh. 18, AN at p. 185. 
27  Christopher Nash (ed.), Narrative and Culture: The Uses of Storytelling in the Sciences, Philosophy and Literature. 
(Routledge, 1986). An extended version of my paper is in RE (2006) Ch. 10. 
28 A striking example is Donald McCloskey, who went on to write The Rhetoric of Economics (University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1985) in which he showed ‘the “hardest” of the social sciences to be literary even when 
mathematical, rhetorical even when nonverbal. In general argument and detailed case studies he reveals the 
extent to which economic discourse employs metaphor, authority, symmetry, and other rhetorical means of 
persuasion.” (Cover synopsis).  




knocked over the Bunsen burner’, or ‘how we coped when the grant ran out’), rather working 
in accounts of the contributions of the principal researcher, thereby lending authority to the 
findings, and writing up scientific research projects as if they were heroic quests, with heroes, 
villains, and magic helpers.29 
When they turned to law, the organizers invited Lord Denning, the most famous judge 
of his day, who was well-known both as a raconteur and for vivid evocations of the facts of 
cases in his judgments. The invitation did not scorn flattery. It read in effect: ‘Dear Lord 
Denning, We believe you to be the greatest legal story-teller of your generation. Will you 
please come to Warwick to tell us your secret(s).’ Lord Denning is reported to have replied 
along the following lines: ‘Dear Warwick, I am indeed the greatest story teller of my 
generation, perhaps of the twentieth century, but I am too old to travel to Warwick. Yours 
sincerely, Denning.’  
There were two sequels to this rebuff. First, despairing of finding a single substitute for 
Denning, the organizers invited two academic lawyers: Professor Bernard Jackson, who had 
written about legal semiotics, and myself, a former member of staff at Warwick, and known 
for a dilettante interest in literature.30 I accepted, but also suggested that if Denning could not 
come to Warwick, Warwick might go to Lord Denning. We did; it was fun, but that is another 
story.31 
Until the Warwick workshops, I had never thought in a sustained way about narrative 
in relation to law. My previous engagement with law and literature had been mainly in relation 
to standpoint and to quotations as grace notes. As soon as I focused on narrative, stories and 
themes popped up from many different contexts: barristers’ “war stories”, lawyer jokes, 
accounts of causes célèbres and miscarriages of justice, Brian Simpson’s wonderful contextual 
studies of leading cases, lawyer novels, Lord Denning’s famous after dinner stories, and so 
on.32 But apart from such frivolities, stories also figure prominently in legal practice. The law 
reports are a vast anthology of short stories about disputes of every kind. And in the law 
reports, one may find several kinds of story in a single judgment: the facts of the case 
(sometimes retold two or three times), the story of the proceedings leading up to the decision 
(but rarely the end of the story as far as the parties were concerned), and the story of the law, 
tracing the development of the applicable doctrine through a series of precedents, often 
stretching back a century or more (Lord Denning was a master of this technique). Or a case 
may be just one episode in a long-running feud or campaign. In the subject of evidence story-
telling is often contrasted with rational argument and logical analysis, and “atomism” with 
                                                   
29 I am grateful to Rom Harré for checking this. 
30 B. Jackson who went on to write Law, Fact and Narrative Coherence (Merseyside, 1988) and Making Sense in 
Law (Deborah Charles Publications, 1995) and some distinguished works on Rabbinic legal theory. 
31 Recounted briefly in RE (2006) at pp.280-83. A transcript of the interview survives and could eventually 
be written up. 
32 E.g. AWB Simpson, Leading Caes in the Common Law (Oxford University Press 1995) discussed in William 
Twining, ’What is the Point of Legal Archeology?’ (2012) Transnational Legal Theory 166.  In the United 
States, the Law Stories series, published by Foundation Press, brings together contextual studies by leading 
experts, mainly of landmark cases to be found in mainstream American case-books on Tax, Torts, Property, 
Evidence, and so on. The series considerably facilitates the integration of contextual approaches into existing 
mainstream American courses. It could well be repeated in other jurisdictions. …….. 




“holism”. 33  Psychologists tell us that juries decide more by weighing the plausibility of 
competing stories than by careful analysis of the evidence.34 Manuals of advocacy stress the 
importance of constructing and presenting vivid, coherent, persuasive stories. 35  Even in 
appellate cases, a standard mantra is: “The statement of the facts is the heart of the 
argument”.36 
This introduction to ‘the narrative turn’ had an immediate impact on my approach to 
evidence. Up to then I had been focusing on the logic of proof and Wigmore’s chart method 
for constructing and criticizing arguments about disputed facts in complex cases.37 I was aware 
that psychologists had shown that American juries choose between plausible stories rather 
than trying to decide in a mainly logical way, but that suggested a deficiency in jury decision-
making.38 Wigmore had claimed that his logic of proof was a superior alternative to “the story 
method”, which he dismissed as lazy, seat-of-the-pants impressionism.39 It soon became clear 
to me that Wigmore was wrong and that stories play a crucial part in investigation, advocacy, 
and judicial determination of facts and “in making sense of a case”, whatever that means. Less 
obvious was the fact that story-telling transcends the divide between questions of fact and 
questions of law and that persuasive story-telling is an important part of determining disputed 
questions of law in particular cases.40 The relationship between rational argument and story-
telling and between background generalizations and stories became a central concern of my 
work on evidence.41 
 I decided that stories played an important, perhaps essential role, in investigation, 
advocacy, and adjudication, but I also realized how dangerous they can be. Of course, this has 
been a central theme in the history of rhetoric from the sophists through Cicero and Quintillian 
to Chaim Perelman’s school of new rhetoric. I once tried to use Plato’s Gorgias in teaching 
Jurisprudence, with mixed results. My main concern at the time was with uncritical 
acceptance of narrative and a failure to see its relevance to the problematic distinction between 
law and fact.  Enthusiasm for the narrative turn led to many excesses: “narrative” became a 
kind of magic wand for solving problems; the term was extended beyond tightly defined 
stories, involving temporality, particularity, and coherence, to almost any kind of discourse. 
In some writings, they were lauded as a substitute for evidence: for example, in an empirical 
study, two American sociologists, Bennett and Feldman, argued that stories serve as aids to 
selecting from a superfluity of information and to filling in gaps in that information. Their 
argument was that stories provide frames of reference for evaluating and interpreting evidence 
                                                   
33 Discussed RE passim, esp. 306-11. 
34 N. Pennington and R. Hastie “A Cognitive Theory of Jury Decision-making: The Story Model”, (1991) 
13 Cardozo L. Rev. 519; further developed in R.Hastie (ed.), Inside the Juror (Cambridge University Press, 
1994) 
35 See RE pp. 306-320 and references there. 
36 Karl Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals (Little Brown, 1960) 238, RE .296-303. 
37  AN passim, esp. 115-7, 124-5, 225.  
38 See n.35 above.  
39 J.H. Wigmore, The Science of Judicial Proof. (Little, Brown 3rd edn 1937)  s.36. 
40 RE pp. 296-306. 
41 RE Ch. 8-11, AN, Ch. 10;  T. Anderson, ‘On Generalizations, a Preliminary Exploration’, (1999) 40 South 
Texas L. Rev. 455; , and ‘Generalisations and Evidential Reasoning’ in P. Dawid, M. Vasilaki and W. 
Twining (eds.), Evidence, Inference and Enquiry (British Academy 2011), Ch 8. 




in terms of completeness and consistency.42 But the idea that stories can be used to fill in gaps 
in the evidence goes against all legal standards of fact-determination; it means the same as 
papering over the cracks in the argument. Further enquiry, including into that neglected brand 
of literature manuals of advocacy, suggested that stories are wonderful vehicles for cheating 
according to defensible ideas about what is involved in proving facts. Innuendo, 
confabulation, sneaking in irrelevant or ungrounded facts, focusing on the actor rather than 
the act, appealing to hidden prejudices and stereotypes, emotive language, and other dubious 
means of persuasion are commonplace in advocacy.43 And, of course, good or familiar stories 
are often more appealing than true stories.44 It is not just advocates who use stories in such 
ways. In the opening paragraph in the famous case of Miller v Jackson45  Lord Denning, a 
brilliant but erratic story-teller, can be shown to have been unjudgelike in about a dozen ways: 
The opening paragraph reads; 
“In summer time village cricket is the delight of everyone. Nearly every village has its 
own cricket field where the young men play and the old men watch. In the village of Lintz 
in County Durham they have their own ground, where they have played for these last 70 
years. They tend it well. The wicket area is well rolled and mown. The outfield is kept 
short. It has a good club-house for the players and seats for the onlookers. The village 
team play there on Saturdays and Sundays. They belong to a league, competing with the 
neighbouring villages. On other evenings after work they practice while the light lasts. 
Yet now after these 70 years a judge of the High Court has ordered that they must not 
play there any more. He has issued an injunction to stop them. He has done it at the 
instance of a newcomer who is no lover of cricket. This newcomer has built, or has had 
built for him, a house on the edge of the cricket ground which four years ago was a field 
where cattle grazed. The animals did not mind the cricket. But now this adjoining field 
has been turned into a housing estate. The newcomer has bought one of the houses on the 
edge of the cricket ground. No doubt the open space was a selling point. Now he complains 
that, when a batsman hits a six, the ball has been known to land in his garden or on or 
near his house. His wife has got so upset about it that they always go out at weekends. 
They do not go into the garden when cricket is being played. They say that this is 
intolerable. So they asked the judge to stop the cricket being played. And the judge, much 
against his will, has felt that he must order the cricket to be stopped; with the 
consequences, I suppose, that the Lintz Cricket Club will disappear. The cricket ground 
will be turned to some other use. I expect for more houses or a factory. The young men 
will turn to other things instead of cricket. The whole village will be much the poorer. 
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And all this because of a newcomer who has just bought a house there next to the cricket 
ground.”46 
 
In this passage, extraordinary even by common law standards, the great judge can be 
convicted of inventing facts, suppressing facts, using emotive terms to characterise one of the 
parties, and giving a completely misleading impression of the context of the case, evoking 
nostalgic images of nineteen-thirties village cricket in rural Hampshire in respect of the fiercer 
game in a depressed Northern mining village.47    
 Of course, there are deep contested issues about the relationship between logic and 
rhetoric, between story-telling and inferential reasoning, and what are legitimate and 
illegitimate techniques of persuasion in forensic contexts. The tensions in the study of evidence 
are particularly acute because evidence in legal contexts is a field that has been invaded by 
statisticians, especially Bayesians, epistemological sceptics, and post-modernists who blur or 
deny distinctions between fact and fiction. 48  
B. Italo Calvino 
Old-fashioned literary criticism influenced my thinking on standpoint; “the narrative turn” 
challenged some important assumptions about evidence in law; the writings of Italo Calvino 
had other important effects. Notice that my concerns and literary influences were of different 
kinds. Note, too, that each of these examples is a fit topic for socio-legal studies. Clarification 
of standpoint is as important in empirical enquiry as it is in legal analysis and legal practice; 
studies of how legal actors in fact reason and use stories are almost as important as normative 
thinking about how they should and should not reason or use stories; and, I shall suggest, 
Calvino is at least as relevant to socio-legal enquiries as to some other concerns of the 
discipline of law. 
I undertook to make the case for Italo Calvino’s significance for jurisprudence. My 
thinking on standpoint and narrative was greatly helped by writings about literature. Calvino 
tapped into other existing concerns even more. I shall begin with a personal account of three 
ways in which I have been influenced by him, before making the general case. I shall focus on 
two books: Mr Palomar and Invisible Cities.49 
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I first encountered Mr. Palomar when I was starting to think about the implications of 
so-called “globalisation” for understanding law in the world as a whole - surely a worthy 
aspiration for our discipline. Mr. Palomar wishes to understand the universe and ‘reduce it to 
its simplest mechanism.’ He decides to start with particulars. He tries first to see and fix in his 
mind one individual wave as a precise and finite object. He fails. He tries again and again and 
becomes neurasthenic. He tries to work out how to control his lawn by focusing on a single 
square metre of it. In order to count how many blades of grass there are, how thick, and how 
distributed he uses statistical analysis, description, narrative, and interpretation. He fails again. 
He feels oppressed, insecure. He nearly has a nervous breakdown. Maybe describing the moon 
or a constellation of stars viewed from the earth is easier than describing a wave or a patch of 
grass. But “this observation of the stars transmits an unstable and contradictory knowledge.”50 
They move, they change, there are faint glimmerings. He distrusts the celestial charts.51 
 Mr. Palomar’s predicament is that of any scholar dealing with a complex subject. It 
obviously applies to socio-legal enquiries. It is also especially acute for those who try to write 
histories of the world or to give an account of the universe of law. To be sure, there are patterns 
to be discerned, but they can be elusive, fragile, unstable, impressionistic, and mainly on the 
surface. If we are to avoid Mr. Palomar’s neurosis and paralysis, we may have to be content 
with painting bold selective pictures with fragile, crude, unreliable materials. And, as Palomar 
realises, there is no closure on scholarly enquiry. 
  A second inspiration from Calvino concerns legal cartography. In thinking about 
globalisation, I started to explore the idea of depicting legal phenomena in the world as a 
whole and significant portions of it in terms of maps: both physical maps and mental maps.52 
I found some help in the literature on urban sociology - for example there are four images of 
cities recurring in that field: the city as organism, as machine, as bazaar, and as jungle.53  It 
immediately struck me that these images or metaphors could be almost equally applied to 
depicting legal systems or institutionalised normative orders. 
Images of the common law as an organic form of law or as a kind of social engineering 
are commonplace in our discipline. The standpoints of people as users or consumers of law in 
a bazaar is less developed.  The metaphor of jungle is richly ambiguous: we wish to preserve 
and visit rain forests, but the image of jungle can be alien, oppressive, requiring skills of 
survival. This is an image of law as a hostile product of other people’s power. This was a 
helpful counterpoint to the thinking of depicting law in terms of physical maps, but neither 
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solved the problem of depicting immensely complex and varied phenomena in terms of a total 
picture. 
   After I had presented my rudimentary ideas on legal cartography to a seminar in 
Miami, a colleague (Michael Froomkin) came up to me and said in effect: “I thought you liked 
Calvino. Why on earth did you not use his Invisible Cities?” The answer was that I had not read 
it. When I did I had not only to rewrite my paper, but also to adjust my ideas. It opened up 
vast new territories of thinking about and seeing law. 
Invisible Cities is a rich, elusive, wonderful book. If only one member of this audience 
is stimulated to read it, this talk will have served a purpose. I cannot begin to do justice to it 
here.  But I can pluck out a few themes: 
The bulk of Invisible Cities is taken up with Marco Polo the world traveller depicting to 
the great Emperor, Kublai Khan, the places he has seen on his travels. For example, Esmeralda 
is only one of 55 depictions of different cities, or perhaps 55 depictions of one city, Venice. 
Esmeralda suggests to me one image of how people inhabit and use legal orders that legal 
scholarship and even socio-legal studies rarely reach. The 55 depictions are fanciful, playful, 
amusing, bemusing, cryptic; most are open to different interpretations. Calvino seems to agree 
with Sir Patrick Geddes, a prominent town planner, that “Though the woof of each city’s life 
be unique, and this may be increasingly with each throw of the shuttle, the main warp of life 
is broadly similar from city to city.”54 Ditto legal systems. Can one imagine a modern state 
legal system without a constitution, law-making bodies, courts, judges, criminal laws, 
enforcement agencies, contracts, registers, and so on? As we jet set around the word there is a 
sameness about municipal legal systems. As Calvino remarks, “Only the name of the airport 
changes”. Yet for him the variety within each city is infinite, and nearly everything seems to 
change. Calvino’s central concern is to present universality in an anti-reductionist way. He 
does this by presenting the almost endless possibility of multiple perspectives on even simple 
objects; “Cities like dreams are built of desires and fears, even if the thread of their logic is 
obscure, their rules absurd, their perspectives deceiving.”55 “Only in Marco Polo’s accounts 
was Kublai Khan able to discern, through the walls and towers destined to crumble, the tracery 
of a pattern so subtle it could escape the termites’ gnawing.”56 
Invisible Cities captures the endless difficulties of describing, explaining and 
generalizing about cities and legal phenomena. It is especially suggestive in relation to 
comparative law -  still in my view a subject that is under-theorised.  
C. Confronting post-modernism 
In the 1990s fashionable ideas about “post-modernism” reached legal theory largely through 
literary theory, after a typical intellectual lag. My reaction was deeply ambivalent. My work 
on evidence had convinced me that I was a cognitivist in epistemology. Following Susan 
Haack, I accepted her “innocent realism” which builds on the work of the American 
pragmatist, Charles Saunders Peirce. There is a real world largely independent of our 
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knowledge of it. A description is true “if “something is so…whether you or I, or anybody 
thinks it is true or not.”57 How can one make sense of the idea of evidence and inferential 
reasoning without at least a working distinction between ontology (what exists) and 
epistemology (how we ascertain what exists)? When I came to confront post-modernism in its 
many shapes including cultural relativism, Rortyian pseudo-pragmatism, and various kinds of 
epistemological scepticism, I was both an innocent realist and a fan of Borges, Barthes, and 
some magic realist novels. So I felt that I was experiencing cognitive dissonance.  
 Post-modernism has done much to undermine simplistic views of interpretation and 
to challenge sharp dichotomies between fact and fiction, reason and imagination, objectivity 
and subjectivity. I thought such ideas to be important, but dangerous. These are healthy 
challenges, but they can descend into extreme forms of irrationalism, irrealism, or relativism 
that threaten ideas worth defending.  For example, in respect of evidence, how can one talk of 
miscarriages of justice, wrongful conviction of the innocent, convincing evidence (e.g. of 
weapons of mass destruction or chemical weapons), reasonable doubt, good as opposed to 
true stories, or errors of fact without some differentiation of ontology and epistemology, of 
fact and fiction or falsehood? 
Calvino (along with Charles Saunders Peirce and his henchman Sherlock Holmes) 
rescued me from this deep ambivalence towards post-modernism. He emphasises the 
elusiveness and complexities of reality, multiple perspectives and multiple descriptions, and 
anti-reductionism, but he still maintains a distinction between epistemology and ontology, 
and, on my reading, he is a cognitivist in a way that is compatible with innocent realism, which 
allows for all of these. Multiple descriptions of the same object are important, often necessary, 
but incompatible descriptions cannot be jointly true.58 
Of course, “post-modernism” means many things and Calvino is open to many 
interpretations. He rejected the label, but he disliked being labeled. I ended up distinguishing 
between imaginative post-modernism typified by Calvino and irrealist post-modernism, 
typified inter alios by Richard Rorty. There is much that could be debated on this. 
  So, I have found Calvino helpful in respect of the nature of scholarship [and enquiry] 
in legal cartography, in comparative law, on standpoint and narrative, in confronting post-
modernism, and for many specific insights. Calvino attracts me personally in many ways: I 
love his succinctness; his playfulness as well as his serious intentions; he adds new dimensions 
to the idea of standpoint; he dwells on the limits as well as the uses of language; he stresses 
history; he is au fond a pessimist, but he is a joy to read. But beyond my personal tastes and 
particular concerns, he seems to me to offer a lot to the enterprise of understanding legal 
phenomena. Colleagues will find other themes and particular apercus. I find that the analogy 
between depicting cities and legal orders is highly suggestive; he has much to teach about the 
problems of describing, comparing and generalizing about social and legal institutions and 
relations as they operate in practice. And he is fun to read.  If I had to select one general theme 
which is central to my discipline it relates to the general exchanges between Marco Polo and 
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Kublai Khan. These are as significant as the descriptions of particular cities. The great Khan 
is concerned to reduce his empire to order to try actually to control it. He is a systematiser, a 
reductionist. In a wonderful passage, they are contemplating a chessboard: “By disembodying 
his conquests to reduce them to the essential, Kublai has arrived at the extreme operation: the 
definitive conquest, of which the empire’s multiform treasures were only illusory envelopes. 
It was reduced to a square of planed wood.”59 Then Marco Polo spoke: “Your chessboard, sire, 
is inlaid with two woods: ebony and maple. The square on which your enlightened gaze is 
fixed was cut from the ring of a trunk that grew in a year of drought: you see how its fibres are 
arranged? Here a barely hinted knot can be made out: a bud tried to burgeon on a premature 
spring day, but the night’s frost forced it to desist…”60 And Polo goes on to talk about “ebony 
forests, about rafts laden with logs that come down the rivers, of docks, of women at the 
windows…”61 For Polo, a single square in a chessboard is a launching point for a potentially 
endless enquiry. Katherine Hume suggests that the exchanges between Polo and Kublai Khan 
can be treated as a dialogue within a single composite mind.62 I think that is right about both 
Calvino and basic tensions within the discipline of law. 
That is sufficient. 
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